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A few questions 
Since the two of us have been very interested in the language-thought relationship for 
a long time, we decided we should start working together somehow, and we proposed 
the idea of a special issue to Theoria. Our specific interest in this classic problem is try-
ing to avoid a purely philosophical approach (i. e., the attempt to identify and solve 
some of the numerous problems by only using conceptual analysis). In addition to 
conceptual analysis, which is always needed in dealing with notions so difficult and 
elusive as language and thought, we wanted to look for approaches that were charac-
terized by the explicit effort to take into special consideration some form of empirical 
evidence. With this goal in mind, we invited philosophers who have been working on 
the problem with an eye on empirical results, and scientists whose publications 
showed not only relevant results for the problem, but also philosophical interest. The 
stature of the authors who accepted to participate in the project is so remarkable that 
we must start by expressing our gratitude to all of them here. 
 The aspects of the relationship between language and thought we are mostly inter-
ested in should be first understood within the usual framework, so we proposed the 
following list of questions to our authors: Is language mostly expression of thought? 
Is thought mostly independent from language? (affirmative answers to these two ques-
tions provide the essentials of the expressivist view of language). What are the main 
influences of language over thought, if any? Is language able to not only influence 
thought, but also constitute it? (a positive answer to this question is the heart of lin-
guistic relativity). What kinds of arguments should be used to establish the most rele-
vant positions?  
 These are the classic questions in the field of blank that philosophers have consid-
ered and attempted to answer for centuries. So we added other questions pointing to a 
more empirical direction: What sort of empirical evidence should be considered to an-
swer those questions, if any? The experiments on the linguistic relativity hypothesis 
have been clearly relevant, especially in the last decade, but should the evidence com-
ing from the ontogenetic and philogenetic investigations also be used to decide the 
relevant questions? In addition, how does the evidence coming from the experiments 
about teaching primates a complex language relate?  
 Finally, we could not avoid asking some questions related to the dominant ideas 
since the “cognitive revolution” took place in the sixties: are the hypotheses of an in-
nate, universal grammar (common to all possible human languages) and a language of 
thought (that concepts pre-exist the actual learning of any language) still relevant to 
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this classic controversy? In general, is the cognitivistic, nativist paradigm still useful to 
integrate the new results coming from so many different fields? And if not, how could 
we even figure out an alternate paradigm? 
 The following papers have all addressed at least some of these questions, often 
from very different viewpoints, but always in a clear and very interesting state of the 
art fashion, and also taking into explicit consideration the empirical evidence available, 
so we believe our goals have been satisfactorily achieved. 
 We will first introduce our main authors —in alphabetical order— to readers by 
describing their past work as it relates to our field. Lastly, we will indicate the way in 
which their present contributions can be inserted into that general framework. 
A few answers  
Andy Clark  
 Though it is not a widely spread attitude among contemporary philosophers of 
language and mind, some philosophers openly reject both the language of thought hy-
pothesis and the expressivist view of language. One general pattern which this opposi-
tion has been fit into, made popular by Daniel Dennett (Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, 1995), 
has it that words, and language in general, far from being means of expressing con-
cepts and thoughts pre-existing in the speakers’ minds, have to be conceived as tools 
that augment our cognitive abilities and generate contents otherwise out of their 
reach. Clark has shared this insight and given it his own hallmark in his recent publica-
tions. His influential paper “Magic Words: How Language Augments Human Compu-
tations” (1998) propounds a view of language as an external artifact designed to func-
tion as a complement of those biological capacities we humans share with other ani-
mals. Specifically, Clark underlines the ability of labeling, that is, of using words to tag 
things and their properties and relationships, and the deep computational impact this 
resource has on basic learning capacities. Labeling allows to selectively attend to the 
organism’s environment and to reduce the descriptive complexity of the scene. 
 In his contribution, Clark persists in his supra-communicative view of language. 
However, it seems evident that he is moving beyond the idea of language as an exter-
nal artifact. Language provides humans with a rich collection of tools that sculpts and 
modifies the processes of selective attention in substantial ways. Linguistic rehearsal is 
now acknowledged as having a central role in understanding consciousness by bring-
ing along resources to self-monitoring and self-control. However, the main novelty 
Clark contributes is the idea that language performs a disciplinary function. This 
means that language stabilizes the flux of ever-shifting and contextually dependent 
modes of encoding and representing reality in the service of learning, reasoning and 
self-control and that dampens its affect valence by creating a mediating space between 
our immediate urges and the needed responses. In anchoring our own experiences and 
trains of thought, we open the way to inspect old ideas and to critically value and ex-
tend them and manage to manipulate our neural endowment. Language, Clark argues, 
is like the beaver’s dam in being a part of the world which has been collectively con-
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structed, and it deeply differs from the beaver’s dam in helping to create a cognitive 
niche, a symbolic creation that promotes learning, reason and controlled action. 
Terrence Deacon 
 The Symbolic Species (1997) is doubtless the single most important contribution re-
garding the problem of the origins of language. Deacon’s detailed approach in this 
work takes into consideration every relevant angle and question and brings them to 
another level. Among the numerous new arguments contained in Deacon’s work there 
is one which is usually regarded as the most challenging against the nativist conception 
of language: the universal grammar hypothesis. After Chomsky’s scepticism about any 
evolutionary explanation of universal grammar, Pinker and Bickerton attempted to 
supply such explanation through the so called Baldwin effect, which stipulates that 
every species able to learn can acquire new adaptive behavior ontogenetically, then as-
similate that behavior philogenetically through genetic mutations. Enter Deacon: since 
the formal traits of universal grammar have no empirical existence —they are com-
patible with many different surface representations— they cannot be learned, so only 
a miracle could “explain” how they might have been genetically “assimilated” by a 
whole species. Since the Baldwin effect seems to be our better candidate to explain the 
origin of language there must be other traits, common to all languages, which might 
have played the empirical role needed for genetic assimilation and transmission. Lan-
guage and brain co-evolved together, and language, as the most formidable adaptive 
instrument, was the motor of brain expansion and finally of the further anatomic 
changes which characterize our species. This should serve as an illustration of the 
main ideas brought forward in the 1997 work. 
 Since then Deacon has been refining some of his original arguments, and the paper 
appearing in this issue is a sample of his more recent efforts. He now argues that there 
cannot be a correspondence between the linguistic models assumed by universal 
grammar and the structural/functional traits of our brain, since they are common to 
other non-human primates, so our language processing is carried through the same 
structures/functions used by other primates. The logic of linguistic analysis is the re-
verse of the logic of evolution: language is an evolved, social phenomenon following 
biological laws. Its logic is the logic of the brain micro-evolution: self-organized and 
emergent. The basic linguistic units are not atoms of analysis but final products of a 
cognitive process, so a new analysis of the speech act is provided within a socio-
communicative framework by using the formidable concepts of neuroscience. Lan-
guage is simply a neurologically emergent function produced by the interaction of a 
variety of biological systems, which take place through different levels of neural dif-
ferentiation. 
Christopher Gauker 
 Gauker’s crusade against expressivism (i.e., the primary role of language is to en-
able speakers to convey the contents of their mental states to their listeners) goes back 
a long way. His books, Thinking Out Loud (1994) and Words Without Meanings (2003) 
both argue forcefully and at great length against this doctrine and elaborate on an 
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original alternative. His conviction is that any notion of thought is worthless if under-
stood regardless of the norms of discourse that guide conversation. Even the postula-
tion of mental states, like beliefs and desires, to make sense of human behavior is 
worthless if they are severed from the linguistic institutions of assertion and com-
mand, respectively. Thus, Gauker takes a belief to be something you attribute to S to 
make an assertion on S’s behalf. Analogously, he takes a desire to be something you 
attribute to S to make a command on S’s behalf. Very few authors in the current phi-
losophical scene, with the possible exception of Robert Brandom, argue along the 
same path as Gauker. Although he does not share Brandom’s inferentialism, Gauker 
also thinks representational theories of linguistic meaning and mental content con-
front insurmountable difficulties. 
 Expressivism is, however, a philosophical doctrine present both in theory and 
practice of Cognitive Psychology. It has been explicitly applied in explaining how is it 
possible for children to learn concepts independently of their ability to acquire lan-
guage. In his contribution Gauker examines in detail an experimental paradigm devel-
oped by Paul C. Quinn and Peter Eimas, who hold that concept learning consists of 
forming a representation of a mental category. Gauker argues that their experimental 
results could be accounted for by resorting to an understanding of concept learning 
that combines the ability to carry out similarity judgments (‘x is represented as more 
like y than z’) with the requirement that the similarity spaces that support those judg-
ments have boundaries that only get stabilized in language use. Therefore, Gauker re-
jects the view of adopting language which focuses on the association of those con-
cepts one articulates in propia experientia with the words found in people’s mouths. To 
learn the meaning of a word cannot consist of associating the word to a previously 
identified concept, because concepts are not in the mind ready to be tagged. On the 
contrary, we gain an understanding on our concepts in the course of learning to use 
words. 
John A. Lucy 
 Lucy’s celebrated publications in the 1990’s somehow supposed the revival of lin-
guistic relativity —the effect of linguistic diversity on thought, which had almost dis-
appeared from the public eye for decades, after the Chomskyan nativist wave invaded 
the academic territory. They provided us with the best available analysis of the theo-
retical framework of the existing contributions to the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. Even 
more importantly, they contained a very detailed case study whose methodological 
lines were destined to definitely overcome the usual suspicious attitude before the 
possibility to scientifically test the actual influence of language diversity over thought. 
Much beyond Whorf’s usual method of comparing the grammar of two languages, 
then launching hypotheses about the different thinking systems involved, Lucy re-
quired four independent steps: (i) comparing two linguistic communities; (ii) stating an 
external reality as a pattern for calibrations; (iii) using a reference category with impor-
tant significance to those languages; (iv) evaluating the cognitive predictions, made on 
the basis of the comparison, through the non-verbal performance of the testing indi-
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viduals. By applying this pattern and comparing English and Yucatec he showed that 
the concept of similarity is language-dependent: in English it is associated to the ex-
ternal form of the objects considered, while in Yucatec it depends on the material 
substance they are made of. 
 The Lucy paper appearing here discusses the present state of linguistic relativity in 
the light of the last 20 years of fruitful research, mostly by delving deeper into its rela-
tionship with language diversity —the way language differs in rendering the same real-
ity. I.e., into the relation between the interpretation of reality encoded in particular 
languages and the way the speakers of those languages think about reality. Most of the 
research can be classified into two approaches: domain-centered and structure-
centered. In the first approach a particular domain of experience is selected (color, 
time, space, etc.) then its consequences for the partition of reality are investigated. The 
second approach selects a grammatical structure (number, gender, etc.) then investi-
gates how different “realities” may emerge from that structure in terms of thinking. 
Lucy favours the second method, where his research regarding the concept of similar-
ity is inserted, since the first is more difficult to test. In reviewing his latest research, 
several important theoretical questions are raised, mostly about the influence of cul-
ture rather than language, and about whether there is a “real” linguistic relativity. The 
paper ends with a general discussion of the whole resulting picture. 
Sue Savage-Rumbaugh 
 Kanzi the bonobo is probably the most famous ape in the history of science. 
Through Savage-Rumbaugh’s publications in the 1990’s we learned that apes can un-
derstand and use our natural languages to an impressive degree of performance. In a 
comprehension test, where Kanzi had to follow hundreds of orders through sentences 
never heard before, he exhibited the correct behavior more than 70% of the time. He 
also learned the English language in the exact same way children do: by listening to 
English speaking people in a context of communication, and with no specific training. 
In addition, he showed that the critical period for learning language is not a unique at-
tribute of humans, nor is it specifically linguistic, since adult bonobos cannot learn in 
the same way, despite much training. His ability to master the English language was, 
and still is, simply astonishing: Kanzi is able to use multitude of words and sentences 
in a full and meaningful way through a sophisticated keyboard. There is no longer 
doubts that he understands the syntactic aspects involved in many different linguistic 
usages, as well as many complex subordinate clauses, pronouns, adverbs, etc. These 
are well-established facts that cannot be ignored. 
 In the paper contained in this monographic issue, Savage-Rumbaugh, and some 
other members of her team, go a step further, and state that it is precisely a shared cul-
ture with humans which make it possible for bonobos to develop forms of higher cog-
nition. It is through an interactive life that both humans and apes learn about shared 
emotions, intentions, perceptions, norms and even mythologies. The paper offers 
three well documented instances of culture prefiguring cognition: imitation, theory of 
mind and language. Imitation is not a precondition for culture: certain shared cultural 
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traits raise the bonobos’ desire to imitate. Also, the paper clearly shows bonobos to 
have a very developed theory of mind: they are able to understand and recognize 
other bonobos/humans as individuals with emotions, desires, beliefs, will, etc., which 
is proven through linguistically mediated tests. As for language, after the tremendous 
success of the bonobos’ performance, which includes extensive use of language be-
tween bonobos, involving a complex variety of goals, the paper defends the hypothe-
sis that a new concept of language is needed, as language is an integral aspect of cul-
tural practices. Thus, shared enculturation changes the bonobos’ cognitive capabilities 
for the better, and no limit can today be even envisaged. 
Stuart Shanker 
 Shanker’s publications as they relate to our field are numerous, but perhaps his 
philosophical analysis of the implications of Kanzi’s linguistic capabilities for our un-
derstanding of the human mind is the most well-known. The rejection of Cartesianism 
is one of the consequences. More recently, Shanker started collaborating with Stanley 
Greenspan, a very distinguished child psychiatrist from the US, and the two of them 
published a remarkable book: The First Idea: How Symbols, Language and Intelligence 
Evolved from our Primate Ancestors to Modern Humans (2004). This is a very original and 
certainly ambitious work, whose main thesis is twofold: (i) philogenetically, language 
did not appear due to mechanisms related to genes and natural selection, but mostly 
to cultural practices developed and transmitted over millions of years; (ii) ontogeneti-
cally, children develop language through a series of steps based on the emotions raised 
in the social interchanges with caregivers, mostly involving gestures, body language, 
and reading of facial expressions. The resulting regulation of emotions gives place to 
the formation of ideas by converting the raw emotive materials into signals with cog-
nitive value. This bold approach is called the functional-emotional view of language, 
which is developed throughout the book in a variety of rich and suggestive sections. 
 The collaboration of Shanker and Greenspan extends to our present paper, which 
takes the kernel of the argument in the former book a step further, through recent re-
search in language development. Language acquisition should be explained, not in 
terms of the usual nativist activation of a pre-wired universal grammar, but in terms of 
the same socio-cognitive and learning processes appearing in many different sorts of 
cultural learning. There is no sudden appearance of language, but a gradual transition 
from pre-symbolic forms of communication to full language. Affect is the main cata-
lyst of the success of that transition, since it avoids that the otherwise correct usage-
based approach, and other useful socio-cognitive views, may be seen as exhibiting a 
mentalist character. The pleasant relationships with caregivers are transformed into 
the source of cognitive development through a “joint attentional frame” that is cre-
ated and maintained thanks to affect, which makes the communicative process of ges-
tures, expressions, tones and postures possible. All this is inserted into the framework 
of a variety of recent empirical studies in the field, then a final section points to a 
whole field of future research where the functional-emotional approach is shown as a 
promising tool. 
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